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NOTES
DISCLOSURE PROBLEMS IN SALE AND
LEASEBACK TRANSACTIONS
During the past five years the sale and leaseback agreement, a novel financing device, has been employed as a method of securing working capital for various types of enterprises, especially merchandising corporations. The following
list, a compilation of selected recent leaseback transactions, shows the amount
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of cash received by companies that sold real property and simultaneously
leased the same land and buildings from the purchaser on a long-term basis:
Vendor-Lessee

Abraham

and

Selling Price
of Property

Strauss,

Brooklyn ............
Allied Stores .............

Vendor-Lessee

General Motors ..........
$ 9,ooo,ooo
16,ooo,ooo

Foundry ..............
Bamberger, Newark ......
Bonwit Teller ..........

3,000,000
6,750,ooo
6,250,ooo

Gimbel, Philadelphia .....
Gimbel, Pittsburgh .......
Goldblatt, Chicago .......
Koppers Co .............
Liquid Carbonic .........
Lit, Philadelphia .........

Bullock's, Los Angeles ....
Continental Can .........
Foley, Houston ..........

io, ooo, ooo
io,ooo,ooo
i3,6oo,ooo

Marshall Field ..........
Sears, Roebuck ..........
Western Union ..........

American

Machine

and

Selling Price
of Property
Si, 132,000

5,ooo,ooo
5,ooo,ooo

1,400,000

4,000,000

6,ooo,ooo
2,700,000
4,100,000

46,850,000
12,500,000

This note will consider the problems relevant to the establishment of an appropriate method of adequate disclosure for sale and leaseback transactions in
the annual reports of corporations to their stockholders. Accounting principles
indicate different means of disclosure depending upon the assumption made
about the nature of the transactions. If it is assumed that the transaction consists of nothing more than a sale and a lease, the usual methods of accounting
disclosure may suffice: Lease commitments ordinarily receive footnote treatment in the balance sheet at most. On the other hand, if it is assumed that the
transaction is in essence a loan, then it may follow that the sale and leaseback
transaction is to occupy a prominent position in the liability section of the
balance sheet along with other loan obligations. But the legal status of the
transaction has not been determined. Therefore, any method of disclosure of
leaseback arrangements suggested at the present by the security analyst, accountant, attorney or the Securities and Exchange Commission-the parties
who serve management, investors, and creditors--should give due prominence
to essential information about the transactions without suggesting an implicit
or explicit conclusion as to their legal nature. The problem of appropriate disclosure may be stated as two separate questions: What ought to be required by
way of disclosure in the published annual reports in the year in which a leaseback
is contracted, and what ought to be required in all subsequent years it is in
effect?
In the typical sale and leaseback transaction, the vendor sells real property
to an institutional investor, and immediately leases back the identical property
for a long term of years. The leaseback provides for annual "net rent" payments, which are computed at the outset so as to provide amortization of the
purchase price over the term of the lease plus a fixed return on the purchaser's
investment. The tenant contracts to pay taxes, insurance, maintenance and
remodeling costs, and retains fully as much control over the property as a
mortgagor would. Some of the agreements contain renewal clauses which provide
for a rental payment of a small percentage-in some cases as low as two per
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cent-of the appraised value of the land, while others contain options to repurchase at nominal sums after full amortization of the purchase price.
A representative leaseback transaction consummated in 1947 was that in
which the American Machine and Foundry Company sold all its land and buildings to The Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States for $3,000,ooo. Simultaneously, American leased the same land and plants from Equitable
for a period of twenty-three years with four renewal options of ten years each.
Following accepted conventions and conservative principles of accounting, the
firm of certified public accountants that regularly audits American's books of
record and account gave no accounting recognition to the lease agreement in the
annual report of American to the stockholders, except for a brief, ordinary footnote to the balance sheet., It should be noted that "window-dressing" of the
balance sheet follows automatically for a sale and leaseback transaction whenever current accounting conventions are used, for they serve to distort some of
the financial ratios used for purposes of security analysis. This result can be
emphasized through comparison of one actual and two hypothetical balance
sheets of the American Machine and Foundry Company. The company's condensed balance sheet at June 30, 1947, prior to the sale of property, was as
follows:
BALANCE
Current Assets .......... $13,247,o67
Investments .............
4,125,953
Fixed Assets, net ........
5,991,479
Prepaid and Deferred Items 1,819,544

SHEET A
Current Liabilities ....... $ 4,286,825
Preferred Stock ..........
8,ooo,ooo
Common Stock and Surplus 12,897,218

Total ............... $25,I84,043

Total ............... $25,184,043

If the company had accounted for the sale and leaseback transaction without
revealing the lease obligation in the liability section, the balance sheet would
have been presented thus:2
'American Machine & Foundry Co., Annual Report (1947), Note C. Some information
about lease arrangements was given the stockholders by means of a comparative balance sheet
for December 31, 1947 and 1946, the property section of which was as follows:
Land ...............................
Buildings
................................
Machinery and Equipment...................

Total.....
Less reserves
fordepreciation................
Net property, Plant and Equipment ......

1947

1946

$5,675,532

$ 340,999

$5,675,532

$7,557,434

,588,321

$4,o87,211

2,958,759
4,257,676
2,414,231
$5,143,203

2For purposes of simplification, the entire amount of the sale has been deducted from net
fixed assets. Actually, there was a book profit on the sale of $6o5,39o, after taxes of $231,803,
which resulted from the sale of the property at a price in excess of book value.
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BALANCE
$16,247,o67
Current Assets ..........
4,125,953
Investments .............
2,991,479
Fixed Assets, net .........
i,8i9,544
Prepaid and Deferred Items
Total ............... $25,x84,043

SHEET B
..... $ 4,286,825
Current Liabilities
8,o00,ooo
Preferred Stock ..........
Common Stock and Surplus 12,897,218
Total .............. $25,184,043

If financing had been secured by the more traditional methods of mortgaging
the property or obtaining a loan on the general credit of the corporation, a pro
forma balance sheet would have been as follows:
BALANCE SHEET C
$16,247,o67 Current Liabilities ..... $ 4,286,825
Current Assets ..........
3,000,000
Funded Debt ............
4,125,953
Investments .............
8,000,000
5,991,479 Preferred Stock ..........
Fixed Assets, net ........
12,897,218
and
Surplus
Stock
Common
i,819,544
Prepaid and Deferred Items
Total .................

$28,184,043

Total ...............

$28,184,043

A computation of the ratio of total assets to total liabilities for Balance
Sheets B and C present strikingly different results: The ratio for Balance Sheet
B (and Balance Sheet A) is approximately 5.87 to i, while that for Balance
Sheet C is only 3.87 to i. The mere choice of sales and leaseback financing
rather than mortgage or debenture financing adds to the appearance of strength
on the balance sheet if conventional accounting technique is used.
While the leaseback may serve to "window-dress" the balance sheet, it has
an opposite effect upon subsequent income statements. The annual operating
expenses of a leaseback lessee are rent, taxes, insurance, and maintenance under
a net rent lease, while those of a mortgagor are depredation, interest, taxes,
insurance, and maintenance. The last three items of expense are present under
both forms of financing, but the rent payment, being an amortization of principal plus interest, will be higher than the total of depreciation and interest for a
number of reasons. First, in the event that a corporation selects sale and leaseback financing rather than a mortgage or a debenture issue to secure a given
sum of working capital, it will be charged a higher rate of interest. Explanations
of the differential in rates are not entirely satisfactory, but a number of persons
engaged in handling leaseback transactions have found empirically that it does
exist.3 Second, for income tax purposes the owner of land may not charge depreciation against the land,4 while the leaseback lessee in effect depreciates the
3 "In general, insurance company executives seem to believe that the differential amounts
to approximately I to I of one per cent." Cary, Corporate Financing Through the Sale and
Lease-Back of Property: Business, Tax, and Policy Considerations, 62 Harv. L. Rev. i, 9
1948).
4Reg. iii, § 29.23 (l)-2 (1943).
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land by gauging the rent payments so as to amortize the purchase price of both
the land and buildings. This may be done even if the property has been completely depreciated by the seller for federal income tax purposes. In this latter
instance no charge against income could have been made for depreciation before
the sale nor would the Treasury Regulations have permitted write-up to reflect
the present value of the asset, and then permitted depreciation over the remaining life of the asset.s Unless corporations take the trouble to make two sets of
calculations, it is probable that the same figures will find their way into published reports as appear in tax returns.'
Thus it may be seen that the special effects of sale and leaseback financing
on the income statements of lessees are so extensive that adequate disclosure is
required for the protection of investors and creditors. The need is particularly
evident in the case of those corporations for which the funds procured by sale
and leaseback financing constitute a large proportion of the capital structure,
since the presence of heavy fixed rent payments has the usual effect of too much
leverage upon the earnings of the equity interest.
The uncertain legal status of the leaseback transaction makes it important
that there be adequate disclosure so as to place investors and creditors on guard.
It would be fair to assume that the management of the vendor-lessee would take
the position that if disclosure must be made, it should be made in a legally
neutral form. Management does not wish the contents of financial statements
to influence adversely the decision on the conceptual plane concerning the legal
status of the parties to the leaseback transaction. However, the ultimate decision by the courts will depend upon the view that is taken of the real risks of
the parties involved: Are they those of lessor and lessee, or those of mortgagee
and mortgagor?
There are three types of litigation in which the question will arise: tax cases
involving the deduction of rent or depreciation by the vendor-lessee as an operating expense; tax cases in which the propriety of registering a substantial
capital gain or loss on the sale of property being leased back is questioned, and
bankruptcy proceedings involving corporations which are vendor-lessees under
sale and leaseback agreements. In all three situations the status of the parties
to the leaseback transaction will be considered, but deciding the real risks in
tax cases will involve considering such things as the positions of the parties in
bankruptcy, while bankruptcy litigation will involve a direct determination of
s Reg. iii,

§ 29.23 ()-5 (i943).

6 Current accounting convention is opposed to depreciation of land. Paton, Advanced Accounting 373 (194). It is not considered conservative accounting practice to permit appreciation of property to effect any change in the income accounting. Ibid., at 349. However, if it is
determined that an error was made in estimating the life of a depreciable asset, in order to
provide a check on the efficiency of management, current accounting theory prescribes that
the reserve for depreciation be debited, the amount be shown as an item of extraordinary income in the year in which the error is recognized, and the asset be depreciated over the new
estimated life. This cannot be done for income tax purposes because original cost is a limitation on the total amount of depreciation allowed.
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the real risks of the parties in the light of the doctrine of fairness and full
compensation.
The first situation has already received judicial treatment. In the only Supreme Court decision concerned with a sale and leaseback transaction, the Court
confined itself to the point at issue and did not determine the status of the
leaseback lessee. In that case, Helvering v. Lazar'us,7 the Court construed federal
income tax law as permitting a taxpayer, who had sold property to a bank and
taken back a long-term lease, to make a deduction from income for depreciation
on the property. 8 If the Court had denied the taxpayer the opportunity of taking the depreciation expense, presumably the taxpayer would have been required to treat the rent payment as an operating expense, which is precisely
what the typical leaseback lessee desires.
Determination of whether the transaction is a lease or a mortgage is also important in terms of Section 112(b)(I) of the Internal Revenue Code9 which
provides that no gain or loss can be recognized if the taxpayer exchanges property for property of like kind. x" Consideration of this provision by the courts
may result in a denial to the vendor-lessee of the opportunity for registering a
capital gain or loss on the sale of the property being leased back." Implicit in
such a decision may be the thought that the relationship between the parties to
a leaseback transaction is something other than the normal landlord and
tenant relationship.
The definitive ruling on the real risks of the parties to a leaseback transaction will be made when a large corporation with such an agreement faces reorganization under Chapter X of the National Bankruptcy Act. 2 If the vendorlessee had chosen to mortage the property, (or if the courts treat the sale and
7308 U.S. 252 (1939).
8 It is not essential that the taxpayer claiming a deduction for depreciation be the owner
of legal title to the property. Duffy v. Central R. Co. of New Jersey, 268 U.S. 55 (1925)
(lessee occupying under 999 year lease permitted to take depreciation on betterments having
a useful life less than the term of the lease); Cogar v. Com'r of Internal Revenue, 44 F. 2d
554 (C.C.A. 6th, 1930) (purchaser of the interest in 99 year lease entitled to take depreciation
on improvements erected by his predecessor in interest); Rankin v. Com'r of Internal Revenue,
6o F. 2d 76 (C.C.A. 6th, 1932) (depreciation may be taken if use or occupancy by lessee will
exceed life of the improvement).
9 53 Stat. 37 (1939), 26 U.S.C.A. § I12 b (i) (i945).

1oSee Cary, op. cit. supra note 3, for an extended discussion.

"1The sale of property by American Machine and Foundry Company resulted in a large
book profit. If the company can pay the 25 per cent capital gains tax on this amount and treat
the rent payments as expenses, the savings in taxes will be substantial. This may be a partial
solution for the problems of those business men who have been complaining that the profits
reported by business today are higher than they are in actuality because allowable depreciation expense is inadequate. They point out that at present prices it may cost twice as much to
replace property that is being worn out as the depreciation charge permitted by the Bureau
of Internal Revenue.
12SEC v. United States Realty and Improvement Co., 31o U.S. 434 (1940) (insolvent large
corporation must reorganize under Chapter X provisions).
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leaseback agreement as a disguised loan and fraudulent conveyance) in reorganization the claim of the lender against the other assets of the vendor-lessee would
be limited to the difference between the claim and the appraised value of the
security.13 Whether this would be more onerous to the management or the
equity interest than a claim limited to three years' rent 4 would depend upon
the market price and marketability of the property at the time of insolvency.
Since insolvency is likely to occur at a time when real property is marketable
only at a sacrifice because of general business depression, it is probable that the
market price at the time of insolvency would be so much less than the unrecovered principal of the vendee-lessor that the general claim would exceed the
total of three years' rent. In such a situation the vendor-lessee and its equity
interest would be in more strategic positions if the leaseback transaction were
considered a lease rather than a loan. Moreover, from the standpoint of flexibility and bargaining in reorganization proceedings the choice between affirmance and disaffirmance of a lease may be better alternatives for the management
and the equity interest than the satisfaction of claims of mortgagees on an
absolute priority basis.5
Management's concern that the commercial community will not conclude
that the leaseback transaction is a loan as a result of the accounting treatment
given it must be balanced with the investor's desire for disclosure that will
permit meaningful comparisons to be made between the financial condition and
prospective earnings of one corporation with those of others. The methods of
treatment advanced by an investors' service, the accounting profession, the
Securities and Exchange Commission, and by attorneys will now be scrutinized
to see if they satisfy the requirements of both the primarily interest groups.
Only the most sophisticated investors and professional security analysts
would be able to make adjustments to financial statements for the purpose of
making financial comparisons between companies using the leaseback method
of financing and those using debt financing, even where there was knowledge of
the existence of commitments under long-term leases. In his effort to determine
the financial condition of a corporation, the security analyst must obtain data
to supplement the financial statement whenever there is inadequate disclosure.
In this role he is perhaps the severest critic of the present form of disclosure accorded sale and leaseback agreements in annual reports to stockholders.
Confronted with the similar problem of adjusting the financial data of railroads using leased facilities with the financial data of railroads using their own
facilities, Moody's Investors Service instituted the following procedure as an
aid to investors:
CapitalizationFactors:A tabulation is presented under "Capitalization and Other
Factors." This table shows not only bonds, stock and capitalized rentals on a per mile
X352

Stat. 896 (1938), ii U.S.C.A. § 616(7) (1946).
Stat. 893 (1938), ii U.S.C.A. § 602 (1946).
"5Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. io6 (1939); Northern Pacific Ry.
Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (I923).
'4 52
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basis but also equipment and joint facility rent net debit or credit and other income
less miscellaneous deductions capitalized at five per cent on a per mile road basis. The
total of all the above are presented as adjusted capital.
This tabulation shows the "effective" capitalization on a per mile basis and is
presented for more direct comparison of the capitalization factors of the various
railroad companies. Unless such factors as joint facility rents, equipment rents,
non-operating income and miscellaneous deductions are considered, capitalization
comparisons may be misleading. Other things being equal, a large rental debit for
joint facilities offsets low funded debt and large non-operating income offsets funded
6
debt, etc.'
Implicit in this uniform capitalization of leases at five per cent is the assumption that all the leases are equally advantageous or disadvantageous at all times.
The procedure outlined by Moody's was undertaken because of the need for a
feasible solution to the problem of providing comparable data. But since it is
aware that the procedure adopted is not entirely satisfactory, Moody's has
continued to study the problem, as the following statement by an official of
Moody's will reveal:
For the past two years, we have given considerable thought as to the proper
figure to use in capitalizing rentals.... We realize that (the 5% rate) has not been
changed with changed conditions, and for this reason we have been reviewing it. We
are not yet prepared to change the 5% figure, but may make some modification before
the next Railroad manual appears.
We have hesitated to use a similar procedure, that is, capitalizing rentals in respect
to companies other than railroads, for the reason that standardized accounting has
not been followed to the same degree as in railroads. We are considering, however,
adding a footnote to the income accounts of industrials and utilities, showing the
X
amount of rental included in operating expenses.'
In a leaseback transaction the primary security is the general credit of the
vendor-lessee, and not the property being sold. 8 This points to another inherent
weakness in attempting to apply Moody's technique to sale and leaseback
transactions. In the case of railroad leases the rent of leased facilities is objectively determined by arms-length bargaining, but the net rent payments under
a leaseback need not necessarily bear a relationship to the value of the proper16Moody's Manual of Railroad Securities-i948, p. x.
'7 Letter from Mr. Edmund L. Vogelius, Manager of Ratings, Moody's Investors Service,
dated November 24, 1948.
18 In hopes of profiting from the expected increase in demand for frozen food after the war,
Liquid Carbonic Corporation constructed a plant at Morrison, Illinois, for the manufacture
of boxes for deep-freeze coolers. The plant was sold to Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance
Company, and Liquid Carbonic became the tenant under a long-term lease. Since the expected
demand for frozen food has not materialized, Liquid Carbonic has virtually abandoned the
plant. Opportunities for sub-letting are relatively poor in the community, and Liquid Carbonic will have to endure the burdens of the lease for a long period to come. Despite the lack
of marketability of the property, the insurance company anticipates no difficulty in the continued collection of rental payments because of the sound financial condition of Liquid Carbonic.
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ty.S9 The rental payments reflect the sale price agreed upon and not the price
at which the property could have been sold in the market. Thus, it can be said
that the sale price and rental payments reflect the relative strength or weakness
of the general credit of the vendor-lessee.
This may be illustrated by a hypothetical example. An institutional investor"°
might be willing to pay a large corporation with excellent credit $3,ooo,ooo for

a warehouse, whose value was $2,ooo,ooo, if the net rent payments of the leaseback agreement provided for amortization of the amount plus a fixed rate of
return over the fairly short period of twenty years. The obvious reason is confidence in the ability of the corporation to repay the amount in due course. The
investor probably would be willing to pay only $i,Soo,ooo for the same property
with the same type of leaseback arrangement to a company in a weaker financial
condition. The institutional investor would require at least the protection it
would have as a mortgagee. A company with a relatively weak financial condition might not be able to secure financing by sale and leaseback at all.21 Certainly, the less the confidence of the investor in the general credit of the prospective vendor-lessee, the smaller would be the price that would be set for the
property. But, whether the vendor-lessee is a corporation with a very strong
financial position or one with a somewhat weaker position, it could increase the
amoun of funds realized from the property being sold by decreasing the length
of the lease during which the purchase price, or at least that part of the purchase
price which represents excess over the market price, is being amortized. That is,
a corporation might be able to sell the same property referred to above at
$5,ooo,ooo if the net rent payment under the lease taken back was $i,oooooo
"plus" for a period of three years and something like the market rental thereafter.
There are at least three pressures tending to keep the sale price at something
like the price that would prevail in an unencumbered sale. First, there is the
lack of inclination by the institutional investor to speculate on the credit of the
19Particularly would this be the case if the purchaser were a subsidiary or a charitable
trust controlled by the vendor. Under such circumstances, the price would be agreed upon
between the directors of the vendor, acting qua vendors, and the directors of the vendor, acting qua trustees or as directors of the subsidiary.
2oThe term "institutional investor" is used because insurance companies, charitable
foundations, and tax-exempt educational institutions have been the major investors in leaseback transactions. The impossible tax position that would result is a bar to participation by
investors that do not enjoy tax advantages: The net rent payments received would have to
be treated as income, and depreciation of the building, not the land, would be the only expense,
thus resulting in a large net income. These facts have led some critics to assert that the sale
and leaseback transaction is only a method by which a tax-exempt institution can "sell" its
exemption.
2 See N.Y. Times, p. 29, col. 5 (Dec. I3,1948), quoting Dr. Vincent S. Hart, investment
executive of Oberlin College: "It is true that you can always run into a hazard. That is why
we pick our investments so carefully. We look primarily to the credit of the organization, and
not the value of the property we buy. If the concern cannot pay the money due on its lease,
then of course we would get stuck. There might be some difficulty during a depression, but
we pick and choose extremely carefully."
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vendor. Second, a sale at $3,ooo,ooo or $5,ooo,ooo in the hypothetical situation

would probably be considered a write-up by the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
and the supposed tax advantages of the transaction would not be permitted.22
Third, there is the ever-present fear that if the transaction should be scrutinized
by a court, an inflated sales price would serve to characterize the transaction as
a loan rather than a lease. If the sale were made at the market price, which
depends upon the effectiveness of these pressures, and the rate of capitalization
of the leaseback were an appropriate one, then it may be that the method used
by Moody's for railroad leases might be applied to leaseback transactions to secure comparable data that might be satisfactory for security analysts. But the
technique would still leave unsolved the problem of balance sheet disclosure,
and the balance sheet is a financial statement upon which many investors rely.
The accounting profession has been stirred to recognition of the inadequacy
of current treatment of long-term leases in the balance sheet by the criticism
that one of the main reasons for resort to the sale and leaseback financing technique is the "window-dressing" of the balance sheet.23 This criticism and the
proposed remedies can be evaluated in terms of the function of the balance
sheet and the information that statement should serve to disclose according to
accepted principles of accounting. One certified public accountant has pointed
directly at the crux of the problem the leaseback presents for the accountant in
his efforts to furnish essential data to management, investors, and creditors:
Another argument against accounting recognition of the lease is the difficulty of
determining the amount at which to record the asset and obligation, and the subsequent treatment which should be followed.
The difficulty alone is not sufficient reason for omission. As Paton and Littleton
say in discussing the problem of donated assets, "Every economic facility employed by
the enterprise, regardless of its origin, should be carefully administered, and recognition
in the accounts of all such facilities is necessary to a proper computation of earning
power.'24

Although the accounting profession has recognized the problem of disclosure
of sale and leaseback arrangements, it has proposed few solutions, presumably
because of doubt concerning the legal nature of the transaction. However, there
is a segment of the profession which has sought acceptance of "special purpose"
financial statements as a solution to this new problem and many older problems
of financial reporting. Despite increasing emphasis on the income statement as
the primary financial report, the necessity for presentation of the financial condition (that is, the balance sheet) of an enterprise has persisted. Yet, there is a
great deal of inaccuracy in adding, with a semblance of mathematical certainty,
-Reg. III, § 29.23 ()-5 (i943).
"3See Myers, Presentation of Long-Term Lease Liabilities in the Balance Sheet, 23 Accounting Rev. 289 (1948); Blough, Current Accounting Problems, 86 J. Accountancy 247
(1948); Cannon, Danger Signals to Accountants in "Net Lease" Financing, 85 J. Accountancy
312 (1948); Kircher, Long Term Leases and the Balance Sheet, i6 Controller 388 (1948).
24 Kircher, op. cit. supra note 23, at 389.
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assets whose value can be absolutely (Cash and its equivalent) or reasonably accurately determined (Receivables) with other assets whose valuation is fairly
accurate in the short run and a guess in the long run (Inventories) or whose valuation is simply a guess in either the short run or long run (Fixed Assets). Ordinarily, no attempt is made to adjust the vagaries of valuation of the latter
assets to the fluctuations of the price level as is attempted in the valuation of
inventories at the lower of "cost or market." Since there is this basic defect in
the balance sheet, this segment of the accounting profession declares that the
individual needs of short-term creditors, long-term creditors, short-term investors and long-term investors can not be satisfied unless special financial reports
are prepared for each.
The special statement is an appropriate solution only for the year in which a
leaseback transaction is originated. It is a method of calling attention to the
existence of long-term lease commitments, but it can not be as helpful as some
other method that will incorporate the information into the regular financial
statements customarily inspected by investors and permit comparisons to be
made.
The Securities and Exchange Commission, in performance of its duty to require full disclosure and accuracy in financial reports under the provisions of
the Securities Act of 193325 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,26 has been
studying the leaseback transaction. An official of the Commission has made the
following statement on the subject:
With respect to "sale and lease-back agreements" and long-term leases our studies
so far seem to suggest two possible solutions:
(i)Accounting treatment comparable to that accorded equipment trust obligations
which would result in reflection of the leasehold as a fixed asset subject to amortization and the rent obligation as a fixed liability.
(2) Footnote disclosure concerning all facts pertinent to the "sale and lease-back
agreement" in a manner which will dearly set forth the significance of such an
agreement in the capitalization structure.
It is our policy at the present time to require disclosure in an appropriate footnote to
the balance sheet as to the following facts:
(a) Proceeds of sale of property and carrying amount on the vendor company's
books prior to sale;
(b) A brief summary of the terms of the "lease-back agreement," e.g., period of years
covered, rental, option to repurchase and option to renew leases;
(c)A grouping of all such leases according to the year of expiration, indicating with
respect to each such grouping the number of leases expiring and the aggregate
minimum annual rental with respect thereto;
(d) The inclusion of a caption on the liability side of the balance sheet such as "Longterm Lease Obligations," with a reference to the footnote disclosing the above
information.
If the "Lease-back agreement" includes an option to repurchase, the company is
2s48
2648

Stat. 74 (1933), is U.S.C.A. § 77a et seq. (1941).
Stat. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78a et seq. (i941).
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requested to consider, in the light of its present intentions, the desirability of reflecting
the purchase price of the property as a liability on the balance sheet with a correspond27
ing asset descriptively captioned such, for example, as "Contract to purchase plant."'
The two possible accounting treatments of the leaseback transaction being
considered by the Securities and Exchange Commission, have been utilized by
the corporations employing the device in their prospectuses circulated at the
time new security issues are offered for sale. 28 But none has chosen to give accounting treatment to the sale and leaseback transaction in the annual reports
to stockholders comparable to that accorded the equipment trust obligation, and
few have given the abundance of facts contemplated in the footnote method of
treatment.
The suggestion of accounting treatment for the sale and leaseback transaction, identical to that accorded equipment trust obligations of railroads subject
to regulation by the Interstate Commerce Commission probably flows from the
familiar mental process of reasoning by analogy. Is the analogy persuasive? To
answer this question it is necessary to have an understanding of the specific accounting technique employed for recording equipment obligations and of the
similarities and differences between the two methods of financing.
The Interstate Commerce Commission requires that the cost of the equipment, less payments applicable to principal, be carried as an asset either in the
general equipment account or in a special leased equipment account, and that a
corresponding liability, "Equipment trust notes," be set up on the balance sheet.
The most popular legal form used for railroad equipment obligations is the
Philadelphia Plan, a type of conditional sales agreement in which title to the
rolling stock or other equipment passes at the time of the last payment. Payments are made in the form of fixed net rent payments just as they are in the
leaseback arrangement, and the "lenders" in both cases are likely to be institutional investors. In both types of transactions, the security is the property bolstered by the general credit of the lessee. The parties to both the Philadelphia
Plan type of equipment obligation and to a sale and leaseback agreement containing an option to repurchase intend that the transfer of title be withheld
until the final payment is made or the option exercised.
27 Letter from Mr. J. K. McClare, Assistant Chief Accountant, Division of Corporate
Finance, SEC, dated November 4, 1948.
28 The following example of the treatment given leaseback transactions in prospectuses
illustrates the amount of information disclosed to investors because of the policy of the
Commission:
"On March I, 1948, the Company sold the Koppers Building in Pittsburgh, Pa., to The
Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States for $6,ooo,ooo and took back a net
lease. The first year's rental under the lease is $375,0oo and each succeeding year's net rental
for the initial thirty-year term is $3,750 less than the last preceding year. The net rental for
the first renewal period is $i5oooo per annum and for each additional renewal period is
$i2o,ooo per annum. In addition, the Company is to pay taxes, insurance, repairs, maintenance and alterations. At the expiration of the twentieth lease year, the Company has the
option of terminating the lease by making an offer, which the lessor is free to reject, to purchase
the leased property at a price of $3,oooooo." Notes to Financial Statements, Koppers Company, Inc., Prospectus Offering $io par Common Stock, at 28 (Jan. io,x949).
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But the fact that investment in a sale and leaseback produces a different
yield from that realized on equipment trust certificates indicates that there are
underlying differences between the two forms of financing. These differences
form the basis for an argument against identical accounting treatment. Equipment obligations sell at yields to maturity which are less than those of any
other class of corporate bonds, while leaseback agreements ordinarily provide a
higher yield than would be afforded by debentures of the same issuer. There are
several possible explanations for the difference in yields. The high cost of tailoring each agreement to the individual needs of a vendor-lessee is one of the factors to which the high interest rates on leaseback transactions have been asscribed, but it is difficult to see how this cost can exceed that occasioned in the
process of preparation and public sale of debentures, although it will exceed the
preparation costs of the standardized equipment trust issue. It is true that the
physical security for the leaseback is not as good as that for the equipment obligation in that rolling stock is movable and may be sold readily for use on another railroad, while land and buildings may require additional investment to
make them suitable for other tenancy or ownership even if there is a market for
the property. On the other hand, the financial condition and general credit of
the typical leaseback lessee is far stronger than that of the railroad obligor, who
often is a chronically ailing member of an industry subject to violent cyclical
fluctuation and the competition of new methods of transportation.
In the discussion of railroad leases it was noted that in contrast to the leaseback the rental is objectively determined. A similar point can be made in regard to the differences between the equipment trust obligation and the sale and
leaseback transaction: for the cost of the railroad equipment financed is also
objectively determined because it is sold to the lessor by a third party, instead
of being sold by the vendor-lessee. There would be no advantage to the lessor
or lessee in paying a price to the third party that is higher than the market price
of the property; the same cannot be said in the situation where the lessor is buying the property from theo lessee. There is still another difference: Unless there
is an option to repurchase in the leaseback agreement, the vendor-lessee will
not be the ultimate owner of the property; on the other hand, it is always contemplated that the equipment trust obligor will acquire title.
Despite the existence of these differences between the two forms of financing,
a tentative guess is advanced that the higher rate of return afforded by the
leaseback is not due to anything inherent in the transaction, but to the current
uncertainty of the business world as to the legal and tax status of the arrangement.2 9 The primary reasons for the popularity and low yield of equipment
trust obligations have been the relatively small dollar amount of the usual issue
in comparison with the total capital structure of the obligor, the short-term
nature (five to ten years) of most issues, and the general belief in their strong
29 Until about igoo a similar statement could have been made about equipment trust
obligations because of diverse treatment by the state and federal courts. See Duncan, Equipment Obligations 97-175 (1924).
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security position because of the favorable treatment accorded these obligations
in reorganization proceedings. In few reorganizations have equipment trust
holders incurred any loss.30 On the other hand, funds derived from sale and

leaseback arrangements may constitute a large proportion of the capital structure of a vendor-lessee, and the typical leaseback is a long-term (forty years or
more) obligation. Only the passage of time can reveal the relative strength of
the bargaining position of leaseback lessors for the device is so new that it has
not been subjected to the stress of a depression period or other financial tension.
The investment world can only draw its conclusions about the security position
of leaseback lessor-vendees from considered guesses and current experience
with the device.
The enumerated differences between the sale and leaseback transactions and
the equipment trust obligation indicate that the needs of investors and creditors
require that even more attention be directed in the balance sheet toward the
presence of the leaseback than to the presence of the equipment obligation because all the differences that have been discussed disclosed possible weaknesses
of the leaseback device. A practical method of accomplishing this aim would be
a three-fold treatment in the balance sheet that can best be illustrated by a return to the data for the American Machine and Foundry Company, and presentation of a new hypothetical balance sheet:
BALANCE SHEET D
Current Assets.. $16,247,o67
Investments.....
4,125,953
Fixed Assets, net.
2,991,479

Current Liabilities....
Long-term Lease Obligations ............
$3,00oooo

Prepaid and De-

Less: Value of Lease-

ferred Items...

i,8g,544

hold ..............

Preferred Stock ......
Common Stock and
Surplus
Total

....

$25,184,043

Total ...........

$ 4,286,825

3000,000*

8,ooo,ooo
12,897,218

$25,184,-43

* In 1947 the Company sold all its plants and land, having a book value of $2,200 oo to an insurance company
for $3,ooo,ooo, and leased the property back for a period of twenty-three years with four renewal options of ten
years each.

If the problem of adequate disclosure of leaseback transactions is, as has been
suggested, that of giving due prominence to the transaction in a neutral manner
so that there will be no presumption created as to the legal nature of the ar30 In 1931 in the case of the Series D issue of Florida East Coast Railway Equipment Trust
Obligations, the lease was disaffirmed by the receiver, and the security holders realized only
43 cents on the dollar from the sale. This is the only case in over fifty years in which there were
any appreciable losses by equipment trust holders. See Graham and Dodd, Security Analysis
739-42 (194o). So strong is the position of this type of issue that in November '939 the Chicago and North Western Railroad was able to issue new equipment trust obligations at prices
to yield only from o.45 per cent to 2.35 per cent despite the fact that all mortgage issues of
the road were in default.
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rangement, then the method used in Balance Sheet D is a feasible solution.
Management may be placated by the treatment since it does not use the conventional methods of recording lease commitments or loan obligations, and so
carries no legal inference. The wealth of detail that is revealed will serve as a
warning to the small investor as well as the institutional investor. For purposes
of making financial comparisons, it is necessary only to move the account
"Value of Leasehold" to the fixed asset section.
Balance Sheet D is an appropriate method of solution to the problem of disclosure of leaseback arrangements, but there are some less drastic methods of
disclosure in the annual reports to stockholders that might be effective for
conveying information about the leaseback agreement in the year in which it is
contracted. A narrative paragraph, preceding the financial statements in the
annual report, is one method of presenting the information without changing
conventional patterns in financial statements. 3 ' The defect of this treatment
alone is that it does not afford a method of making financial comparisons with
the data of the previous year or with the financial data of other corporations in
the same industry. A second possible solution is the presentation to stockholders
of a special statement, such as a comparative statement of funds.32 This treat31 See note 28 supra for illustration of the type of information that ought to be included in a
narrative statement. This ideal may be compared with the information that has been included
in narrative statements in annual reports to stockholders. An example of the latter follows:
"To avoid having too much of the Company's capital invested in land and property improvements, as well as to provide funds for new expansion, selected store properties were sold to
insurance companies and other institutions and the properties were leased back at moderate
rentals by the Company on long-term leases." Sears, Roebuck & Co., Annual Report (1947).
at 3.
32A sample presentation of a comparative statement of funds follows:
X COMPANY
COMPARATIVE STATEMENT OP FUNDS
FOR THE YEARS 1947 AND 1948

Source of Funds:
Net operating income ................
Depredation ........................
Sale of fixed assets ...................
Total ..........................
Application of Funds:
Dividends ..........................
Interest expense .....................
Retirement of mortgage bonds ........
Rent ...............................
Taxes ..............................
Additions to machinery and equipment
Leasehold improvements .............
Increase in inventories ...............
Increase in working capital ...........
Total ..........................

Increase
and
Decrease*

1948

1947
$140,000
8o,ooo
-

$

$

20,000*
8o,ooo*
z,ooo,ooo

$220,000

$1,12o,ooo

$

9oo,000

$ So,ooo
30,000

$

$

30,000*
3oo,000
180 000
20,000*
200,000
zo,ooo
40,000
220,000

$

900,000

.60,00
5o,oco
.20,000

.0,000

$220,0o0

120,000
1,ooo,ooo

50,000
-

-

300,000
180,000
40,000
250,000
zo,ooo
60,000
230,000
S,x20,000

Inspection would reveal the change in the method of financing, the sale price of the fixed
assets, the financial burdens of leasing property, and other useful information. This type of
statement would disclose adequately the facts concerning the leaseback arrangement entered
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ment would allow the investor or creditor to make detailed comparisons between
the company's prospective earnings and those results he might have forecasted
at the end of the previous fiscal year. It does not afford him a method of comparison of the anticipated profits and financial condition of the company with
that data for other corporations. A third solution is a combination of the first
and second methods,33 but this, too, gives no basis for comparison of results
with those of other corporations that do not resort to financing by the sale and
leaseback method.
This note has considered the importance of adequate disclosure of leasebacktransactions in financial statements; it has explored the areas of legal uncertainty that have a bearing upon the accounting treatment; and it has suggested
methods of adequate disclosure. There remains the problem of insuring management's acquiescence in a full disclosure policy for sale and leaseback transactions. To date dollar and cent forces have not succeeded in impelling changes
in annual financial reports to stockholders. But such forces have led to the
drafting of special security provisions in the indentures of new bond issues at
the insistence of underwriters.
In one case, an indenture was drafted which provided that in the event
properties were sold the proceeds must be used for the retirement of the debenture issue34 In the indenture of another issue, a modification of the Securities and Exchange Commission's first solution, treatment comparable to that
accorded equipment trust obligations, was adopted as a method of providing
an additional feature of strength35 The corporation, which does not plan to reinto by American Machine and Foundry Company because all the company's property was
sold, but it would be difficult to pick out meaningful facts about the leaseback transactions of
company that leased property it had not sold, owned mortgaged property, and rented property
under a leaseback.
33 A recent example of the use of a narrative-special statement form of presentation follows:
"It has long been the policy of the Company to keep the amount of its own funds invested
in fixed asset or property accounts on a conservative basis. This is best shown by reference to
the ten year comparative balance sheet included as a part of this report. This policy will be
continued in order to maintain the Company's finances in a relatively liquid position." Allied
Stores Corp., Annual Report (1947), at 23. Investors might draw some interesting conclusions
from the following excerpt condensed from the ten year statement:
JANUARY 3X
1943

1948

$54,277,928

$117,049,292

Land ...................................... $17,69S,669
Buildings and equipment, net .................
8,35,704
Store fixtures and equipment, net ..............
4,792,668

$ 4,449,47z
4,9o6,677

Current Assets ..............................

Improvements to leased property, net .......... x,369,075
Total, Land, Buildings, and Equipment...

$31,993,x6

22,392,248

12,o86,796
$ 32,885,092

The comparative income statement also revealed that Allied Stores had a loss total of $5,173,783 in 1943, 1944, and 1945 on the sale of land and buildings. Only a minute percentage of
corporations present ten year comparative balance sheets and income statements as a part of

their annual reports.
34

American Optical Company Twenty-Year 3* per cent Debentures due March i, x968.
Company Twenty-Year 3 per centDebentures due April i, i968.

35 Bristol-Myers
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sort to sale and leaseback financing arrangements, accepted a covenant proposed by the attorneys for the underwriter that will adjust the financial ratios
to what they would have been if the accounting treatment proposed by the
Commission had been used. Specifically, the indenture contained a provision
that no further funded indebtedness could be created unless on a pro forma
basis the net assets of the company were equal to at least 250 per cent of the
funded debt, and the net current assets were equal to at least 150 per cent of
the funded indebtedness. To this provision was added the following novel covenant:
The company covenants that, so long as any of the Debentures remain outstanding,
it will not sell, or cause or suffer or permit any North American Subsidiary to sell,
any manufacturing plant or other fixed asset if, as a part of the same transaction, the
Company or any North American Subsidiary shall acquire the right to possession or
use of such plant or other fixed asset under any lease, agreement, or other arrangement
which obligates the Company or such North American Subsidiary to pay for such
possession or use for more than one year from the date of such sale unless either (a)
the provisions hereinabove set forth ... shall be fully complied with after (i) giving
effect to such sale and (ii) adjusting Consolidated Funded Indebtedness of the Company and its North American Subsidiaries by adding to each thereof an amount
equal to the total sales price, or (b) forthwith upon such sale, the Company shall give
notice of redemption.., and shall redeem or otherwise acquire and surrender to the
Trustee for cancellation Debentures... of an aggregate principal amount equal to the
total sales price. .... 36
A covenant like this one will afford protection to creditors against the conventional accounting treatment of long-term lease contracts, and the effect of
that treatment upon the ratios prescribed for the protection of creditors. Consider again the three balance sheets previously presented for the American
Machine and Foundry Company. If the preferred stock contract contained a
covenant prohibiting the incurrence of funded debt without the consent of the
preferred stockholders unless the ratio of total assets to liabilities was greater
than 4 to i after the sale of bonds was reflected on the balance sheet, the sale
and leaseback device would have afforded a method for securing new financing
without the consent of the preferred: The company would not have been able
to mortgage the plant or sell $3,ooo,ooo of debentures since the ratio of total
assets to liabilities would drop to 3.87 to i on a pro forma basis;37 but the company could sell the property for $3,ooo,ooo, lease it back for a term of years

equal in length to that of the proposed bond issue, and insert an option to repurchase the property in the lease.38 By means of the sale and leaseback, the
company could secure all the benefits of the funding operation, and the only
difference would be that title to the property would be separated from the
company temporarily.
36 Indenture, at

36.

37 See Balance Sheet C, P. 485 supra.

38 See Balance Sheet B, P. 485 supra.
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The quoted covenant avoids this result by requiring, in effect, that resort to
financing by sale and leaseback be had only when the company might incur
more funded indebtedness as an alternative. But if the business world shows its
intention to treat the sale and leaseback agreement as a loan for one purpose,
it ought not to be shocked if the Bureau of Internal Revenue formulated the
policy of so treating the transaction for tax purposes. Similarly, since management has been willing to permit the treatment of the leaseback as a loan for one
purpose, an inference may be drawn as to acceptable methods of accounting
disclosure. The special security clauses in bond indentures stand as condemnations of the present balance sheet treatment of sale and leaseback transactions.
Full disclosure of information about leaseback arrangements in the annual
reports to stockholders will give them the opportunity of making informed
judgments for themselves. However, since there is no regulating agency with
the power to prescribe uniform accounting practices for industrial and merchandising corporations, it is likely that a considerable length of time will pass
before the needs of investors and creditors will be able to effect adequate
balance sheet presentation for leaseback arrangements in the annual reports to
stockholders through the medium of concerted pressure upon corporations by
the Securities and Exchange Commission, investors' services, the accounting
profession and the bar.

LEGAL BARRIERS CONFRONTING THIRD PARTIES: THE
PROGRESSIVE PARTY IN ILLINOIS
Recent events have produced considerable controversy as to whether or not
statutory provisions in the various states present a serious obstacle to the success of minority political parties.' To the traditional view that existing statutes
have a controlling adverse effect has been opposed the view of a small number
of political scientists who contend that the purported lack of success of minority
parties is due, in the main, to factors more deeply imbedded in our political
structure. 3 This latter view seems to have received at least some confirmation
from the elections of November 1948 in which the newest of the "third parties,"
the Progressive Party, was able to obtain a place on the ballot in forty-five
states, but received surprisingly little support.
Illinois was the scene of the most heated fight with respect to the right of the
Progressive Party to appear on the ballot. Candidates for offices within Cook
County were able to secure their places only after protracted litigation in the
state courts, and candidates for national and state-wide offices were barred alxA tabulation of the statutory provisions governing minor political parties is provided in
Legal Obstacles to Minority Party Success, 57 Yale L.J. 1276, 1292-97 (1948).
2Brooks, Political Parties and Electoral Problems 122, 265 (3 d ed., 1933); Odegard and
Helms, American Politics 782 (1938).

3Sait, American Parties and Elections 3o4 (3 d ed.,

1942).

